Abstract. We improve the best attack on Rijndael reduced to 6 rounds from complexity 2 72 to 2 44 . We also present the first known attacks on 7-and 8-round Rijndael. The attacks on 8-round Rijndael work for 192-bit and 256-bit keys. Finally, we discuss the key schedule of Rijndael and describe a related-key attack that can break 9-round Rijndael with 256-bit keys.
Introduction
Rijndael is one of the five AES candidate ciphers that made it to the second round [DR98] . Rijndael has 10, 12, or 14 rounds, depending on the key size. Previously it was known how to break up to 6 rounds of Rijndael [DR98] . Independently from our work, Gilbert and Minier [GM00] presented an attack on 7 rounds of Rijndael.
In section 2, we describe a new partial sum technique that can dramatically reduce the complexity of the 6-round attacks. We also show how to use these ideas to attack 7 and 8 rounds of Rijndael, in some cases using additional known texts (where available) to reduce the workfactor. The attacks against 7-round Rijndael with 128-bit keys and 8-round Rijndael with 192-bit and 256-bit keys require nearly the entire Rijndael codebook (2 128 − 2 119 chosen plaintexts); they are therefore not very practical even for an adversary with sufficient computing power. All of these attacks use extensions of the dedicated Square attack, as described in [DKR97, DR98, DBRP99] .
In section 3, we turn our attention to the key schedule. We show several unexpected properties of the key schedule that seem to violate the published design criteria. Although we do not know of any attacks that critically depend on these properties, we consider them unsettling. Finally, in section 4, we exploit the slow diffusion of the Rijndael key schedule to develop a related-key attack that can be mounted on 9 rounds of Rijndael with a 256-bit key.
A summary of these attacks, including time and data complexities, is described in table 1. We also refer the reader to appendix A for a detailed listing of notation used to refer to intermediate values in the cipher. 2 The Square Attack
The Original 6-round Attack
We start by describing the 6-round attack in the original proposal [DR98] , which uses a technique first introduced to attack the block cipher Square [DKR97] . This is an attack that works against all block sizes and key sizes. We use m (r) , b (r) , and t (r) to refer to intermediate text values used in round r after the MixColumn, key addition, and ShiftRow operations, respectively. We write k (r) for the subkey in round r, and k (r) for an equivalent subkey value that may be xored into the state before instead of after the MixColumn operation in round r. Please refer to appendix A for a more detailed explanation of our notation.
The attack starts by obtaining 256 encryptions that only differ in a single byte of m (1) , and that take on all values for that particular byte. One byte of m (1) depends on four bytes of the plaintext and four bytes of k (0) . We first choose 2 32 plaintexts by taking a fixed starting point and varying those four bytes over all 2 32 possible values. We then guess the four key bytes that are involved. For each possible value of the key bytes, we can find 2 24 groups of 256 plaintexts such that within each group the encryptions differ in a specific byte of m (1) ; as the plaintexts are different, this one byte of m (1) must take on all 256 possible values.
Tracking these changes through the cipher, we find that each of the bytes of t (4) takes on all possible values. For each of these bytes, if we sum the values it takes on in the 256 encryptions, we get zero. This property is preserved by a linear function, so each of the bytes of m (4) , and of b (4) , also sums to zero over our 256 encryptions.
We now look at a particular byte of b (4) , and how that relates to the ciphertext. For our analysis we rewrite the cipher slightly, and put the AddRoundKey before the MixColumn in round 5. Instead of applying MixColumn and then adding in k (5) , we first add in k (5) and then apply MixColumn. In this configuration it is easy to see that any byte of b (4) depends on the ciphertext, four bytes from k (6) , and one byte from k (5) . We guess these five key bytes, compute the value of our b (4) byte for our 256 encryptions and check whether the sum is zero.
For each group of 256 plaintexts, this filter rejects 255/256 of all wrong key guesses. As we guess a total of nine key bytes, we will need 10 or so groups of 256 encryptions to find the key. (Note that these groups depend on the first four key bytes that we guessed, but not on the last five.)
Overall, this attack requires 2 32 chosen plaintexts, 2 32 memory to store those plaintext/ciphertext pairs, and 2 72 steps in guessing the nine key bytes. Each step involves a partial decryption of 256 ciphertexts, but a proper ordering of these computations can make that very fast. This seems to be comparable to doing a single encryption, and agrees with the complexity estimate given in [DR98] . The overall complexity is thus comparable to 2 72 encryptions.
A 7-round Extension
This attack can be extended to 7 rounds for 192-and 256-bit keys. One simply guesses the 16 bytes of the last round key. When used naively, this adds 128 bits to the key guessing, for a total workload of 2 200 ; the plaintext and memory requirements are not changed, although we do need to use more groups to verify the potential keys.
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This can be further improved. The key schedule ensures that there are dependencies between the expanded key bytes, and we can exploit them in this attack. For a 192-bit key, guessing the last round key k (7) gives us two of the four bytes from k (6) that we would otherwise have to guess plus the byte from k (5) that we would guess. This saves us 24 bits of key guessing, and results in an overall complexity of 2 176 . For 256-bit keys, the bytes in the key schedule are aligned differently. Guessing all of k (7) provides no information about k (6) but does give us the one byte from k (5) that we need. For this key length, the complexity of the attack thus becomes 2
192 . All the details can be found in [Luc00] . 
An Improvement
The attack of section 2.1 on 6 rounds of Rijndael can be improved. Instead of guessing four bytes of k (0) we simply use all 2 32 plaintexts. For any value of the first round key, these encryptions consist of 2 24 groups of 2 8 encryptions that vary only in a single byte of m
(1) . All we have to do is to guess the five key bytes 1 For this attack we use the alternate round representation for both rounds 5 and 6, and thus add k (6) before the MixColumn in round 6. 2 Note that the attack complexities in [Luc00] are given in S-box lookups, whereas we roughly approximate the complexity of a single encryption by 2 8 S-box lookups and use encryptions as our unit. The result is that all our complexity numbers are a factor of 2 8 lower.
at the end of the cipher, do a partial decrypt to a single byte of b (4) , sum this value over all the 2 32 encryptions, and check for a zero result. Compared to the original version, we guess only 40 bits of key instead of 72. On the other hand, we have to do 2 24 times as much work for each guess. All in all, this improvement reduces the workload by a factor of 2 8 , although it needs about 6 · 2 32 plaintexts to provide enough sets of 2 32 plaintexts to uniquely identify the proper value for the five key bytes.
We will now look at this attack in more detail. We have 2 32 ciphertexts. We guess five key bytes, do a partial decryption from each of the ciphertexts to a single byte in b (4) , and sum this byte over all ciphertexts. Consider this partial decryption. From any ciphertext, we use four ciphertext bytes. Each of these is xored with a key byte. We then apply the inverse S-box to each byte, and multiply each with an appropriate factor from the inverse MDS matrix. The four bytes are then xored together, a fifth key byte is xored into the result, the inverse S-box is applied, and the resulting value is summed over all ciphertexts.
Let c i,j be the jth byte of the ith ciphertext. (We leave out the i subscript if we are not talking about any particular ciphertext.) For simplicity we will number the four bytes of each ciphertext that we use from 0 to 3. Let k 0 , . . . , k 4 denote the five key bytes that we are guessing. We want to compute
where S 0 , . . . , S 3 are bijective S-boxes, each of which consists of an inverse Rijndael S-box followed by a multiplication by a field element from the inverse MDS matrix. Given 2 32 ciphertexts and 2 40 possible key guesses, we have to sum 2 72 different values, which corresponds roughly in amount of work to doing about 2 64 trial encryptions. We can organize this more efficiently in the following manner. For each k, we associate a "partial sum" x k to each ciphertext c, defined as follows:
This gives us a map (c 0 , c 1 , c 2 , c 3 ) → (x k , c k+1 , . . . , c 3 ) that we can apply to each ciphertext if we know k 0 , . . . , k k .
We start out with a list of 2 32 ciphertexts. We guess k 0 and k 1 and compute how often each triple (x 1 , c 2 , c 3 ) occurs in the list. That is, for each i, we compute the three-byte value
) as a function of the ith ciphertext and the guessed key material, and we count how many times each three-byte value appears during this computation. As there are only 2 24 possible values for three bytes, we do not have to list all (x 1 , c 2 , c 3 ) values; rather, we count how often each triple occurs. We then guess k 2 and compute how often each tuple (x 2 , c 3 ) occurs; and guess k 3 and compute how often each value of x 3 occurs. Finally, we guess k 4 and compute the desired sum.
Because all sums are taken using the xor operation, and because z ⊕ z = 0 for all z, it suffices to only count modulo two. Thus, a single bit suffices for each count, and so the space requirement for the 2 24 counters is just 2 24 bits. How much work has this been? In the first phase we guessed 16 bits and processed 2 32 ciphertexts, so this phase costs 2 48 overall. In the next phase, we guessed a total of 24 bits but we only had to process 2 24 triples, so this costs 2 48 as well. This holds similarly for each of the phases. In total, the entire computation requires the equivalent of about 2 48 evaluations of equation 1, or about 2 50 S-box applications. This is the amount of work required for a single structure of 2 32 ciphertexts. The first structure already weeds out the overwhelming majority of the wrong key guesses, but we still have to do the first steps of our partial sum computation for each of the six structures that we use. The total number of S-box lookups is thus about 2 52 . Using our earlier rough equivalence of 2 8 S-box applications to a trial encryption with a new key, the 2 52 S-box applications are comparable to 2 44 trial encryptions. This is a significant improvement over the earlier 2 72 workfactor.
Extension to 7 Rounds
We can apply this our improvement to the 7-round attack of section 2.2. To express a single byte of b (4) in the key and the ciphertext, we get a formula similar to equation 1 but with three levels, 16 ciphertext bytes, and 21 key bytes. The partial sum technique is only helpful during the last part of the computation as it only saves work if there are more ciphertexts than possible values for the intermediate result. With 2 32 plaintext/ciphertext pairs in a structure, these techniques will not help until the very last part of the computation.
For 192-bit keys we first guess the 128 bits of the last round key. These guesses also define two of the four key bytes in round 6 that we are interested in, and the one key byte in round 5 that we need. Thus, after guessing the last round key we can reduce each structure to 2 24 counters with our partial sum technique. Using some precomputed tables, we can do this for each of the 2 128 key guesses in about 2 32 memory lookups. The next phase guesses one byte more and requires 2 24 steps to reduce the partial sum to 2 16 counters, and the last phase guesses the last remaining byte and produces the final result. Each of these phases has a cost of 2 160 lookups. We have three phases, each of which costs 2 160 , and we need to process three structures before we start eliminating guesses for the last round key, so the overall cost of this attack is on the order of 2 163 S-box lookups or about 2 155 trial encryptions. For 256-bit keys the alignment in the key schedule is different. Guessing the last round key does not give us any information about the round key of round 6, but it provides most of the round key for round 5. Working in a similar fashion as before, we guess 128 bits of the last round key and compute the four bytes we are interested in after round 6 for each of the 2 32 texts for a total cost of 2 160 lookups. The next phase guesses 16 more key bits and results in 2 24 one-bit counters for a total cost of 2 176 lookups. The remaining phases have a similar cost. The cost per structure is thus about 2 178 lookups or about 2 170 trial encryptions. We need five structures before we start cutting into the guesses of the last round key, so the overall complexity of this attack is about 2 172 .
A Second Improvement
It is possible to push these attacks even further, if we are willing to trade texts for time and increase the data complexity to save on the workfactor. 
a,b for each encryption using our guessed key material, and separate the texts into herds. Examining a single such herd, we find that summing a byte in b (5) over all the encryptions in the herd yields zero, and moreover this property is unlikely to hold if our guesses at the key were incorrect. This yields a working attack against 7 rounds of Rijndael, but the complexity is very high (2 128 × 2 72 steps of computation or so). One can do much better. Note that the byte in b (5) depends only on four bytes of the ciphertext (for simplicity, call them c 0 , . . . , c 3 ) and the byte m depends on only four bytes of the plaintext (p 4 , . . . , p 7 , say). We use a threephase attack; the first phase uses 2 64 counters (the m y 's), the second phase uses 2 32 counters (the n z 's), and the third phase provides the filtering information for key guesses. As usual, all counters may be taken modulo 2, so we need just one bit for each counter. The attack goes as follows. In the first phase, we increment the counter m y corresponding to the 64-bit quantity y = (c 0 , . . . , c 3 , p 4 , . . . , p 7 ) (p 4 , . . . , p 7 ) and the guessed key material), selects a single herd, and updates the counter n z by adding m y to it for each y that is in the correct herd and that agrees with z = (c 0 , . . . , c 3 ) . Afterwards, in the third phase, we guess five key bytes at the end of the cipher, partially decrypt each z to a single byte in b (5) , sum this byte over all 2 32 values of z (with multiplicities as given by the n z ), and check for zero. The third phase must be repeated for each guess of the four key bytes in the first round.
What is the complexity of this attack? The first phase requires us to update a counter for each ciphertext, so using our rough equivalence of 2 8 memory lookups to a trial encryption, the counting should take time comparable to 2 120 trial encryptions. Compared to the first phase, the rest of the attack has negligible workfactor (equivalent to 2 96 encryptions); there is no need to compute partial sums, an exhaustive key search will suffice.
This shows that one may break 7 rounds of Rijndael using 2 128 known texts, 2 120 work, and 2 64 bits of memory. This 7-round attack trades texts for time: it uses a huge number of known texts, but it has better workfactor and overall complexity than the 7-round attack of section 2.3; and moreover, it applies to all key sizes (including the 128-bit keys).
There are a few more small improvements. We used a single byte of m (1) to define our herds, but the four plaintext bytes that we use in our attack and the four key bytes of the first round key that we guess define four bytes of m 128 − 2 119 texts. These changes do not change the complexity of the attack, but give us a slight reduction in the text requirements.
Extension to 8 Rounds
We can further extend the idea to break 8 rounds of Rijndael, though apparently not for 128-bit keys. As before, we obtain 2 128 −2 119 texts (about 2 23 undamaged herds), focus attention on a single herd, and use the fact that a single byte in b (5) will yield zero when summed over all 2 104 encryptions in the herd. However, the byte in b (5) now depends on the entire ciphertext and on 21 subkey bytes at the end of the cipher, so now we must apply the partial sum techniques of section 2.4. Guessing the four key bytes of the first round first to define our herds and computing the partial sums x k one at a time allows one to calculate the desired sum with 2 104 bits of storage and work equivalent to about 2 202 trial encryptions. We need to do this for about four herds before we start to cut our search tree. (We will need about 26 herds in total to get a unique solution, but the workload is dominated by the first four herds.) The overall attack complexity comes out at 2 204 encryptions, and thus faster than exhaustive key search for 256-bit keys.
As this attack needs the equivalent of more than 2 192 encryptions, it seems to be useless for 192-bit keys. But the 192-bit key schedule allows a 2 16 -fold speedup for the 8-round attack, which thus requires the equivalent of about 2 204−16 = 2 188 encryptions. We stress that the time complexity of 2 188 encryptions only holds for 192-bit keys, not for 256-bit keys.
Each byte of b (5) depends on 21 subkey bytes, namely: all the 16 bytes from k (8) , 4 bytes from k (7) and one byte from k (6) . Similar to Section 2.2, fixing the last round key k (8) determines two of the four bytes from k (7) and, depending on which byte of b (5) we target, possibly also the relevant subkey byte from k (6) . More precisely, by choosing three columns (12 bytes) of k (8) one can learn two columns of k (7) , and the fourth column of k (8) also determines one column of k (6) . In each column of k (7) we find one subkey byte we need for the attack. In other words, fixing k (8) (or even only three columns of k (8) ) gives us two useful key bytes of k (7) . (This holds for the 192-bit key schedule. See [Luc00] , where the Rijndael key schedule and this weakness are explained in more detail.)
To describe the attack, we look at the partial sums technique from a slightly different point of view. To attack 8-round Rijndael, we check the sum of the values taken on by one byte from b (5) in the 2 104 encryptions of a herd. For this, we evaluate equation 1 five times: four times on the "bottom level", and, using these four results, a last time taking these four values instead of the ciphertexts c i,0 , . . . , c i,3 . Each evaluation of equation 1 starts with counters for (c 0 , c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , other ) , where the bytes c i and the corresponding keys are aligned in the same column. It can be described by the following substeps:
1. Guess two key bytes, w.l.o.g. k 0 and k 1 , and compute the counters (mod 2) for (x 0,1 , c 2 , c 3 , other ). 2. Guess one key byte, w.l.o.g. k 2 , and count (x 0,1,2 , c 3 , other ). 3. Guess one key byte (k 3 ), and count (x 0,... ,3 , other ).
(Note that we just introduced a slightly different notation for the x some . The reason will become obvious below.)
To attack 8-round Rijndael with 192-bit keys, we obtain 2 128 − 2 119 texts, guess four first-round subkey bytes to obtain our herds, concentrate on a single herd, and target a single byte in b (5) . We continue with guessing three columns of k 8 and evaluating equation 1 for each column. This gives us gives us 2 56 counters (mod 2) for   (x 0,... ,3 , x 4,... ,7 , x 8,... ,11 , c 12 , c 13 , c 14 , c 15 ) . values x 0,... ,3 , x 4,... ,7 , and x 8 Guessing another two bytes of k (7) we get 2 8 counters for x 15 . We can evaluate one byte of k (6) , which allows us to check the balancedness of one byte of b (5) . Note that the order in which things are done is crucial for the time complexity. If we first guessed all 16 bytes from k (8) and only then evaluated the two key bytes from k (7) which we get for free, the speed-up would only be 2 8 compared to the running time for attacking Rijndael with 256-bit keys. In this case, the time complexity would be 2 196 for 192-bit keys, i.e. slower than exhaustive search.
Note that the

Summary
The Square attack can be improved so that it requires 2 44 work to attack 6 rounds of Rijndael. The extension to 7 rounds has complexity 2 155 for 192-bit keys and complexity 2 172 for 256-bit keys. There is also an alternative extension to 7 rounds that can break all key sizes with lower overall complexity (2 120 work) but which requires virtually the entire codebook of texts (2 128 − 2 119 texts). Another result of our analysis is that, for the 256-bit and 192-bit key sizes, one may break 8 rounds of Rijndael faster than by exhaustive search, again with 2 128 − 2 119 texts. The 256-bit key size requires 2 204 work, the 192-bit key size 2 188 .
The Key Schedule
Compared to the cipher itself, the Rijndael key schedule appears to be more of an ad hoc design. It has a much slower diffusion structure than the cipher, and contains relatively few non-linear elements.
Partial Key Guessing
The Rijndael submission document states that the key schedule was designed with the requirement that "Knowledge of a part of the Cipher Key or Round Key bits shall not allow to calculate many other Round Key bits" [DR98, section 7.5].
The key schedule does not seem to achieve that goal. Let us look at the case of a 128-bit block size and 256-bit key in more detail. The key schedule consists of 8 cycles, which produces a total of 15 round keys (the last half of the last cycle is never used). The key schedule can be seen as four separate rows that only have a limited interaction. We will concentrate on a particular row; say, number i. We guess the values K The bytes that we guessed in row i are exactly those bytes that affect row i − 1 mod 4. Thus, if we now guess the first eight bytes of row i − 1, then we can compute the rest of that row for a total of 60 bytes, and if we guess a total of 15 bytes, we learn 88 bytes of the expanded key.
We can extend this with further rows, and get 148 bytes of the expanded key by guessing 23 bytes, and 208 bytes by guessing 31 bytes. There are of course many other ways in which guessing some bytes results in knowledge of many more. On a smaller scale, several of our attacks in section 2 used dependencies between round key bytes to reduce the complexity of the attack.
Key Splitting
Another interesting property is that the key can be "split" into two halves. The two topmost rows interact with the two bottommost rows through only 14 bytes (in the case of 128-bit block size and 256-bit key). If we guess (or know) those 14 bytes, then the rest of the key has been split into two independent halves, each of which controls half of the expanded key bytes. There are many ways to split the key. By rows is the easiest way, but it is also possible to split it by column (at least for a few cycles).
This immediately suggests some kind of meet-in-the-middle attack to a cryptanalyst. However, as the expanded key bytes of the two halves are mixed very thoroughly in the non-linear cipher, we have not found a way to exploit this property. Note that the DES key schedule allows the key bits to be split into 56 independent parts, but no attack is known that uses this property.
Summary
The fact that these properties are present in spite of the stated design goal is unsettling. Some of our attacks make use of the relations between expanded key bytes and would have a higher complexity if these relations did not exist. The attack on 8-round Rijndael with 192-bit keys would be slower than exhaustive key search without these relations. Our attack in the next section also makes extensive use of the properties of the key schedule.
A 9-Round Related-Key Attack
Related-key attacks were first introduced by Biham in [Bih93] and later extended in [KSW96, KSW97] . We assume that the reader is familiar with the basics of related-key cryptanalysis.
The submission states that "The key schedule of Rijndael, with its high diffusion and non-linearity, makes it very improbable that [related-key attacks] can be successful for Rijndael" [DR98, section 8.7], and also lists resistance to related-key attacks as one of the requirements for the Rijndael key schedule [DR98, section 7.5]. We do not feel that the Rijndael key schedule has a very high level of diffusion. It can take many cycles before a low-weight difference starts to affect a significant number of other bytes. This can best be seen if we run the key schedule backwards; each byte affects two other bytes that are (almost) a full cycle further back.
We show how a related-key attack can be mounted on 9 rounds of Rijndael with a 256-bit key. This is basically a variant of the Square attack; we use 256 related keys that differ in a single byte in the fourth round key. We use plaintext differences to cancel out the earlier round key differences, and get three bytes at the end of round 6 that sum to zero when taken over the 256 encryptions. We guess key bytes of the last three rounds to compute backwards from the ciphertext and detect this property.
The Key Difference Pattern
Starting with an unknown base key L, we derive a set of 256 related keys L 0 , . . . , L 255 . The difference L a ⊕ L takes on the value a in bytes 21 and 25, and is zero elsewhere. The diffusion in the key schedule is slow enough that we can track all the differences in the round keys. Figure 1 shows the difference pattern. The key schedule for the 9-round cipher needs to generate 10 round keys. With a 128-bit block size and a 256-bit key, this requires five cycles of the key schedule, which are shown in the figure. Each of the cycles provides two round keys.
The dark gray bytes are the bytes of L that we guess. The light gray bytes are bytes that we can deduce from the guesses that we have made using the recurrence relationship between the expanded key bytes. We guess a total of 27 bytes of the key, and this allows us to compute a total of 66 bytes of the expanded key. We will use all of our guesses in the attack, but for the moment we concentrate on tracking the differences through the key schedule.
In the first cycle we have a difference a in K
1,5 and K
1,6 . In the next cycle we get a difference a in K 
1,6 , and K
1,7 . At this point the difference is first confronted with a non-linear S-box. To track the difference, we need to know K
1,7 of key L; this allows us to compute the output difference b of the S-box given the input difference a. As the shading shows, this key byte can be deduced from the guesses that we have made. In the fourth cycle we get the difference b in K
0,i for i = 0, . . . , 3. Again we encounter an S-box, and therefore we need to know K 
1,7 . We can track the rest of the difference propagation in a similar way as is shown in the figure. All in all, it turns out that we have guessed more than enough bytes of L to be able to track all of the changes. That is, for each value of a, we know the exact value of b, c,
An Improvement
We can now use the techniques of section 2.3 to improve this attack. Instead of guessing the eight bytes of the first round key, we use all 2 64 plaintexts for each of the keys, and sum over all 2 72 encryptions. We will need about 32 structures of 2 72 texts overall to uniquely identify the correct key guess, so our plaintext requirement grows to 2 77 . We now guess the 19 dark gray bytes (152 bits) of K (4) in figure 1 . (This also provides the required information to track the differences between the 256 keys.) We decrypt each of the 2 72 ciphertexts of one structure for one round, and count how often each of the possible values for the four remaining interesting bytes occurs. We are now left with something very similar to equation 1, which requires 2 48 elementary steps. It is clear that this process is dominated by the work of decrypting the last round. This reduces the attack complexity to 5·2
224 . (The factor 5 comes from the fact that we need five of these structures before we start cutting into the guesses that dominate the workload.)
Further Work
There are many ways in which variations on this attack can be made, such as using a different key difference pattern, or possibly applying the partial-sum technique further to reduce the workload. We have not investigated these in any detail. This remains an area for further study.
Summary
There is a related-key attack on 9 rounds of Rijndael with 256-bit keys that uses 2 77 plaintexts under 256 related keys, and requires 2 224 steps to complete.
Conclusions
We examined the security of the AES candidate Rijndael, and described several new attacks and unexpected properties of the cipher. Up to now we have only looked at the Rijndael versions with a 128-bit block size. Although similar in structure, Rijndael with larger block sizes is different enough-the byte alignments that are so crucial to some of our attacks are different-that it will have to be analyzed separately. We introduced the "partial sum" technique, which substantially reduces the workfactor of the dedicated Square attack. We also showed how one may trade texts for time, to penetrate through more rounds of Rijndael when many known texts are available. These techniques allowed us to find attacks that break as many as 7 (of 10) rounds for 128-bit keys, 8 (of 12) rounds for 192-bit keys, and 8 (of 14) rounds for 256-bit keys. Many of these attacks require virtually the entire codebook of texts and hence are not very practical.
The key schedule does not achieve its stated design goals, especially for 192-bit and 256-bit keys. Although we have not found a large-scale exploit of the key schedule properties described in section 3, we find them worrisome.
The 9-round related-key attack has a complexity of 2 224 , which is of course completely impractical; but it is faster than an exhaustive key search, which is the standard measure to compare against. Our results have no practical significance for anyone using the full Rijndael.
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A Notation
The original description of Rijndael uses pictures to define the cipher, and re-uses symbols several times. This makes it difficult to refer in an unambiguous manner to intermediate values in an encryption. To help resolve this problem, we define some extra terminology and symbols for various values in the cipher. We have tried to retain as many of the symbols of [DR98] as possible. For completeness, we have named every intermediate value that seemed of use to us. Many of these definitions are not used in this paper but are included for completeness. All our explanations of the symbols refer to the description in [DR98] .
3a
The byte 3a 16 (and similarly for all other byte values). This can either be a direct byte value, or it can be interpreted as an element of GF(2 8 ).
The byte at position (i, j) at the beginning of round r.
The byte at position (i, j) at the output of round r (just after the key addition). c(x) The polynomial 03x 3 + 01x 2 + 01x + 02 that is used to define the MDS matrix. c i
The bytes of the ciphertext, where i ∈ {0, . . . ,
The number of positions that row i is shifted left in the ShiftRow function. k
The expanded key byte in round r at position (i, j) where r ∈ {0, . . . , N r }, i ∈ {0, . . . , 3} and j ∈ {0, . . . , N b − 1}. For r = 0, it is the key that is xored into the state before the first round. The entire round key is referred to as k (r) . k Note that the key schedule operates in what we call "cycles." This is to distinguish it from the rounds of the cipher itself. If the block size and key size are the same, then a cycle corresponds to a round, but this is not the case in general.
We can now give the various formulae through which these values are tied together. This provides a complete specification of the cipher, although not one that is easy to understand. Note that N b and N k are the cipher parameters that can each take on the values 4, 6, and 8. The multiplication of two bytes is defined as multiplication in GF(2)[x]/(x 8 + x 4 + x 3 + x + 1) and the byte value 
